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The Other Heading and Europe
 Abstract
In Politics of Friendship, the aporias of friendship transposed to democracy indicate that if democracy is a promise of the universal inclusiveness of each singular one counting equally, and if its fraternal or national limitation naturalizes the ineluctable decision of inclusion and exclusion, then true friendship requires dis-proportion. It demands a certain rupture in reciprocity and equality, as well as the interruption of all fusion between the you and the me. In this way democracy remains an un-fulfillable promise. 
In what follows, an imaginary voyage to Europe inspired by the so-called Syracuse-paradigm, by means of a close reading of Derrida‘s The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe, a sort of ’untimely meditation’ a la Nietzsche, I critically argue that Derrida’s idea of European identity, begotten by the irruption of the other, involves the radical other as a force that shows the limits of identity and of the self. Re-viewed, revisited and re-thought in the optic of the deconstructive standpoint, The Other Heading acquires a new light focusing on the possible/impossible relation between the political and the ethical (the Other Heading, i.e. democracy to come, Europe to come). The deconstructive standpoint I use here falls within the well known Derrida’s binary conception that undergird his way of thinking: presence/absence, speech/writing, and so forth. 
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  *
“what remains irreducible to any deconstruction, what remains as undeconstructable as the possibility itself of deconstruction, is, perhaps, a certain experience of the emancipatory promise; it is perhaps even the formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without religion, even a messianic without messianism, an idea of justice--which we distinguish from law or right and even from human rights--and an idea of democracy --which we distinguish from its current concept and from its determined predicates today.” Derrida, Specters of Marx. 1
 ‘’For democracy remains to come; this is its essence in so far as it remains: not only will it remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but, belonging to the time of the promise, it will always remain, in each of its future times, to me: even when there is democracy, it never exist, it is never present, it remains the theme of a non-presentable concept.’’ Derrida, Politics of Friendship 

Proemium
  The second thought quoted in exergue is the wistful statement, like the leitmotiv of Politics of Friendship2, Derrida’s only book with the word "politics" in the title. He begins by commenting on a quotation from Montaigne ”’O mes amis, il n'y a nul ami’ (‘O my friends, there  is no friend’)” and then veers off into a rambling discussion of the quotation’s possible sources and meanings, which leads him to deconstruct concepts such as friendship, hospitality, justice, responsibility and democracy.
 Aristotle conceived politics as the business of friends and regarded the Greek polis as an arena of like-minded men related in citizenship by bonds of friendship. In their social and political behaviors, in their being-in-common, Greek citizens usually first agreed about their interests, second adopted the same policy, and then enacted their common resolves. In Aristotle’s footsteps, Derrida reminds us that the goods internal to friendship bring, with them, their own challenges, and turn Western civilization and philosophy hierarchical into a binary conception involving a pair of terms in which one member (the first) is assumed as primary and the other as secondary. These hierarchical oppositions privilege unity, identity, and immediacy, while they are opposite, independent and equal entities. In such a way, the entire Western tradition of thinking about politics, has been distorted by the ‘metaphysical concept of identity’, by the metaphysic of presence, in which some forms of identity remain difficult to grasp, in which traces of otherness that refuse to be totally mastered persist. 
Derrida believes that the only way to extend the democratic values that he himself holds is to decompose or deconstruct the language by which the West has always conceived of them. He believes that the mistake, drawn up in the language and not in the reality, has kept our democracies imperfect. He believes, too, that only by dismantling the vocabulary of Western political thought can we hope for a new concept of politics. Our metaphysical tradition thinks of man as identical to himself, a coherent personality free from difference that we have been encouraged to seek through membership in undifferentiated, homogenizing groups such as families, friendships, community, culture, nation, and borders, groups dependent on the language, and eo ipso conventions.  The problem with such conventions is not only that they cover up differences within the presumably identical entities, but above all that they establish hierarchies “between brothers and sisters, citizens and foreigners, friends and enemies’ .3
 On January 20, 2001 in Syracuse (Sicily), on the occasion of receiving the honorary citizenship of the city and the Syracuse award, Derrida reaffirmed his never abandoned political engagement. Facing the critique that he was somehow disengaged with the question of the political (Rorty, among the others), he spoke of the Syracuse paradigm as his political temptation. Quite different from the Lure of Syracuse, the Syracuse paradigm is the experience of the philosopher who believes to be qualified to enlighten the statesman with his advices or by serving as a substitute for him. Derrida, who surely cannot be included into a disputable list of philo-tyrannical philosophers, remembered that Plato went to Syracuse to instruct the tyrant Dionysius so that he would became a wise ruler of the city. For this temptation Plato, of noble origins, knew the very gloomy experience of slavery. For this temptation, in modern and contemporary ages, many philosophers paid a dear prize, sometimes with their lives. On the role of the philosopher in politics, it is enough to remember the famous Platonic testimony, “So in my praise of the right philosophy I was compelled to declare that by it one is enabled to discern all forms of justice both political and individual. Wherefore the classes of mankind (I said) will have no cessation from evils until either the class of those who are right and true philosophers attains political supremacy, or else the class of those who hold power in the States becomes, by some dispensation of Heaven, really philosophic”.4 
    When and why did Derrida begin to write and speak of politics? As far as we are concerned in this paper, we can take as a reference-point the falling of Berlin’s wall in 1989, the re-unification of Germany, or the bicentennial of French Revolution. These were the years in which Derrida took part in conferences and symposia, and developed valuable and profound contributions to the issue of politics. These were the years in which Derrida tried to deconstruct the political implications of moral, social and ethical issues and the questions of law and justice, democracy, friendship, hospitality, forgiveness, promise and death penalty. And also, these were the years of divergence from Habermas's Europe (Kantian ethics of identity, the reading of modernity) and the new project of Enlightenment. By the way many, including Habermas, accused Derrida of having repudiated the legacy of the Enlightenment. Against these charges Derrida repeatedly countered that he never abandoned political engagement and claimed to be still a true heir of the Enlightenment, albeit taken in its full historical dimension, and cleared up of its internal contradictions. Others thought- and still think- that deconstruction as a textual and academic project is inherently political for Derrida, not because the deconstruction leads to direct political action through prescriptions, but because deconstruction leads to the possibility of action, in ways political, responsible or not. In other words, Derridean deconstruction of Western metaphysics, of ontology and onto-theology, turns out to be intrinsically and primarily ethico-political in both motive and intention (no democracy without deconstruction, no deconstruction without democracy). Of course, both critiques underestimated the complexity of Derrida’s promise of democracy since they failed to consider how the promise of democracy transforms the terms of political thinking. 
 In Politics of Friendship, Derrida argues that to be capable of friendship we must be able to honour in the friend the enemy he can become. This means precisely the modern motto of democratic republicanism (Liberty, Equality and Fraternity), to be able to honour in the friend, or in the fellow-citizen, the enemy he can become as a sign of freedom, the same freedom that, Nietzsche tells us, tyrants and slaves cannot know, since they are neither ‘equal’ nor ‘free’ enough for either friendship or enmity. Derrida maintains that we cannot guarantee the durability of friendship, and, at the same time, that friendship cannot be coerced. Friendship cannot have a particular purpose as an instrument of subjective desire. The friends must engage either purposefully either without purpose, in the same way the artists do in producing art-works. In friendship as in politics, we must recognize and respect the separation from the other. This is what helps us to understand our diversity from our friend and honour in our friend the enemy she or he could become.
 Now we ask, what are the roles of the geographical and temporal metaphors in the battle of words and ideas that are used to describe Europe and its alleged identity? 
Part I
The deconstruction of European identity
   In modernity, Nietzsche is the thinker who more consciously used the name Europe. He did not spare his own compatriots of critical words for the hybrid foundation of Bismarck’s Reich. In Hölderlin’s footsteps and disappointed by Bismarck, Nietzsche was in search of a German Delos as the central point of the spirit. Returning to the origins, he paid much attention to the youthful Europe just born in Greece, impelled by the need ‘to feel at home, which everywhere is the Greek world’. Within the framework of his philosophy and his nihilism, which is European nihilism, Nietzsche asks not what Europe is, but rather, what does Europe mean, not only for himself as a 19th century acculturated nomad German, or as a French, Italian, or Greek, but for all Europeans. Still today, the Europeans are called to give answers to the Nietzschean query: What does Europe mean for us? For all of us who need to examine with Nietzsche within and without our traditions and historical conflicts, for all of us who need to ask what is at stake after a century of incomplete and exterior nihilism, what does Europe mean?
 In the past Europe has been presented as the ideal example of all that is pure, authentic, and spiritual, either as particular instantiation or teleological model for everyone else or as a specific place, the ‘universal heading’ for all nations and peoples in the world. 5 According to Derrida, the idea of Europe as exemplarity is one of ‘navigation’ or ‘heading’, one of the recurrent metaphors used by intellectuals to evoke the movement of transfer  symbolized by the mythical-figure of Odysseus. The determinant role of Homer in the ancient Greek and Latin culture and in modern and contemporary European culture, that many intellectuals are inspired by, and the topos of Odysseus-​Ulysses, the Man of Many Ways, are well known. The Odyssey has become ‘an ancestral text’ for historians, philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, occult magicians, novelists, science-fiction writers, biographers, auto-biographers, movie directors and composers of operas. To allude to Odyssey means to invoke an archetype, an authority of talismanic psychological power. Let me remind, in passing, that Catherine Malabou in the book Counterpath: Traveling with Jacques Derrida develops an interpretation of Derrida’s thought as a movement constantly arriving without deriving.
 But, there is something else. Europe-as-a-heading is not only the metaphoric European figure par excellence. Europe is a figure beyond the simple metaphor; it means movement towards the radical ‘other heading’. The book The Other Heading is perhaps understandable as an ‘untimely meditation’ a la Nietzsche. In it, Derrida begins with a Europe that has been defined as the capital of culture and the headland of thought, in whose name and for whose benefit the exploration of other lands, other peoples, and other ways of thinking has been carried out, “a Europe where the metaphor of navigation has always presented itself as a mere metaphor, where language and tropes have been ventured in the expectation that they would return with an even greater value attached” (OH, xlv-vi). 6
    Today, Derrida warns, the question of Europe must be asked in a new and heretical way. Above all, the question must be asked by recalling that ‘the other heading' is not a mere metaphor subject to capitalization. Rather, it is the very condition of our metaphors, our language, and our thought. It implies an elementary, even if impossible, transfer between singularity and universality- an antinomy even in Derrida’s opinion- between the particularity of the place and the universality of the idea of place, of the geographic continent called Europe and of the Europe to come, the Europe of Hope.
   The Other Heading is neither the analysis of particular discourses about Europe, nor the proposal to broach the intricate, troubled current problems the Union and the establishment of a transnational European state posits. It is a text in which Derrida denounces the new liberal consensus, which he sees as having ruled the West since 1989, and lashes out hysterically at the ‘New International’ of global capitalism, the financial world and media conglomerates that have established a sort of hegemony. Derrida is less critical of Marxism- see Specters of Marx, a book that continues the reflections on the two genders/genres of la/le capital treated in Other Heading-. He believes that communism became totalitarian when it began by realizing the eschatological program outlined by Marx. In Derrida’ view, Marx’s problem was that he did not fully forward his own critique of ideology and that he remained inside the ontological tradition. This explains the Gulag and genocide, and the terror committed in his name by Soviet Union. 
 What particularly interests us here, however, is that Derrida throws doubts on every political principle of Western philosophical tradition: propriety, intentionality, will, liberty, conscience, self-consciousness, the subject, the self, the person, and community. He asks himself, are judgments about political matters still possible? Can one still distinguish right from wrong, justice from injustice? Are these terms so infected with ontologism that they must be abandoned? Can it really be that deconstruction condemns us to silence on political matters? Can we find a linguistic escape from the trap of language? 
  In The Other Heading, Derrida starts with on an autobiographical note: “To begin, I will confide in you a feeling- Already on the subject of headings [caps] and of the shores on which I intend to remain. It is the somewhat weary feeling of an old European. More precisely, of someone who, not quite European by birth, since I come from the southern coast of the Mediterranean, considers himself, and more and more so with age, somewhat over-acculturated, over-colonized European hybrid ” (OH, 6-7). A personal feeling, indeed, a self-portrait of one who, as early as grade school in French Algeria, tried to capitalize on the old age of Europe, keeping a little of the indifferent and impassive youth of the other shore. “We are younger than ever, we Europeans,’’ Derrida adds, ‘’since a certain Europe does not yet exist. Has it ever existed? And yet we are like these young people who get up, at dawn, already old and tired. We are already exhausted”(OH, 7-8). He suggests another direction in the offing, the urgency of changing destination, maybe a kind of re-journeying following two fundamental principles.
     First, he presents the axiom of finitude. “This axiom of finitude is a swarm or storm of questions. From what state of exhaustion must the young old-Europeans who we are set out again, re-embark [re-partir? Must they re-begin? Or must they depart from Europe; separate themselves from an old Europe? Or else depart again, set out toward a Europe that does not yet exist? Or else re-embark in order to return to a Europe of origins that would then need to be restored, rediscovered, or reconstituted, during a great celebration of "reunion" [retrouvailles?” (OH, 8). And, second, “I will venture a second axiom. I believe it to be preliminary to the very possibility of giving a meaning to such assertions (for example, that of a "reunion") and such questions..., a very dry necessity whose consequences could affect our entire problematic: what is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself [my italics.  Not to not have an identity, but not to be able to identify itself, to be able to say "me" or "we"; to be able to take the form of a subject only in the non-identity to itself or, if you prefer, only in the difference with itself [avec soi. There is no culture or cultural identity without this difference with itself. A strange and slightly violent syntax: ‘‘with itself’’ [avec soi  also means ‘’at home (with itself)’’ [chez soi  (with, avec, is ‘’chez’’, apud hoc)’’ (OH, 9-10). Shortly after, back to the autobiographical, Derrida writes that the suggestion of The Other Heading as the title for his reflections struck him suddenly while he was thinking of air or sea navigation on board a plane. Either by sea or by air there is a problem of direction, and, “it is necessary to recall ourselves not only to the other heading, and especially to the heading of the other, but also perhaps to the other of the heading, that is to say, to a relation of identity with the other that no longer obeys the form, the sign, or the logic of the heading, nor even of the anti- heading—of beheading, of decapitation (OH, 15).
 The heading of the other is the first condition for non-egocentric identity (contrary to the metaphysic of identity mentioned at the beginning).  Openness to the other is the second condition. It deals with the irruption of otherness that occurred in ancient Greece, Derrida confesses that he has discovered by reading Greek words. As R. Gasché comments in his Europe, or the infinite task- A study of a philosophical concept-”if this other in all its forms irrupts into the Greek from the beginning (thus foreclosing any possibility of a Greek self-identity or self-immanence), the Greek, as the source of Europe, is precisely the figure of non-closure upon itself, allowing it to welcome alterity into the logos”. 7  From its origin Europe was opened up not only to conceive of that which comes from outside, but also being merely in opposition to it, to take it as an element of its own essence.  
Odysseus. De-closing the Horizon/European memories. 
 The old Europe seems to have exhausted all possibilities of discourse and counter-discourse about its own identity. Today the topic of European identity is predictably tired and obsolete. ‘’From Hegel to Valéry, from Husserl to Heidegger, in spite of all the differences that distinguish these great examples each other,’’ Derrida tells us ‘’-I tried to mark them elsewhere, in Of Spirit for example- this traditional discourse is already a discourse of the modern Western world’’(OH, 27). It is dated; it is dated in the sense that speaks of Europe from the perspective of its end. As far as the issue of Europe is concerned within the context of the history of ideas, as interpreted by the mentioned intellectuals, it smacks of rhetoric, it is faulty of essentialism and traditionalism; namely it is within the traditional vision of modernity. Now is the time for attempting a dis-continuist approach, for making a leap to leave behind the ideas of Europe of the first half of 20th century, for forgetting the issue of crisis, of the end of Europe, influenced by Hegelian philosophy of the absolute spirit of Europe. In any case, Europe does not have a fixed identity. Europe is bearer of difference, and the concept of head, so dear to Derrida, means less a geographical standpoint and more a philosophical standpoint. It falls within the well known binarysm of oppositions that undergird our ways of thinking: presence/absence, speech/writing, and so forth. 
 ‘To be’ means to inherit human responsibility, and difference is the very site of the possibility of any. We Europeans are called to fulfil the paradoxical responsibility for and to a specific tradition of responsibility -from Latin 'respondere’- that has been bequeathed to us, one which even Nietzsche was appealing to, a contradictory Greek-Roman responsibility:
 “To make ourselves the guardians of an idea of Europe, of a difference of Europe, but of a Europe that consists precisely in not closing itself off in its own identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way toward what it is not, toward the other heading or the heading of the other, indeed—and this is perhaps something else altogether—toward the other of the heading, which would be the beyond of this modern tradition, another border structure, another shore’’ (OH, 29). And 
 ‘’To be faithfully responsible for this memory, and thus to respond rigorously to this double injunction: will this have to consist in repeating or in breaking with, in continuing or in opposing? Or indeed in attempting to invent another gesture, an epic gesture in truth, that presupposes memory precisely in order to assign identity from alterity, from the other heading and the other of the heading, from a completely other shore? ”(OH, 29-30) Assuming or re-assuming, at the same time, the classical concept of responsibility, that is the reference to the genealogy of European responsibility. 
  What we Europeans find difficult to think about today and to produce for a Europe, torn away from self-identification as repetition of itself, is precisely something new and radically unforeseen that requires a break with the present, recognition of the uniqueness of today, the singular event, the singular advent of Europe, and the potentiality of a future in the urgency of here and now. Derrida believes “that this is taking place now ... I believe, rather, that this event takes place as that which comes, as that which seeks or promises itself today, in Europe, the today of a Europe whose borders are not given—no more than its name. Europe being here only a paleonymic appellation. I believe that if there is any event today, it is taking place here” (OH, 30-1). 
The Capital
Derrida goes on to comment on the keyword ‘capital’, which capitalizes on a double significance and two genres of questions. It can be understood as the feminine, as the question of la capital; and second, to the masculine, as the question of le capital, which leads to the theme of the European cultural identity. The ineluctable question of la capital must be translated and displaced within a debate on the current techno-scientific means of communication. On the one hand, it is impossible to accept la capital as a centralizing authority, as a power that, by means of trans-European culture and technology, would control and standardize the artistic discourses and practices to the grid of intelligibility, of philosophical or aesthetic norms in order to pursue ratings and commercial profitability. On the other, at issue is the principle that European cultural identity cannot be dispersed into a myriad of provinces, a multiplicity of self-enclosed idioms or petty little nationalisms, each one jealous and untranslatable. 
 Rejecting both the fragmentation and the traditional idea of the unification of Europe, i.e. the modern concept of union of Europe, Derrida calls for a renewal of the Enlightenment-values and liberal democracy, neither of which by itself could overcome the Eurocentric biases and chauvinism. In deconstructing concepts such as public opinion, freedom of press, responsibility and identity, Derrida’s aims to open up toward new language(s) for contemplating Europe's destiny. He will even venture, ‘’to say that ethics, politics, and responsibility, if there are any, will only ever have begun with the experience and experiment of the aporia. The condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention’’ (OH, 41). And, to be sure, such an aporia has the logical form of contradiction.
 With the contemporary tele-technologies, the geo-political boundaries and territorial markers are subject to displacement and permanent dislocation. Whether demands are made to establish or to protect the national borders and state sovereignty and whether claims are advanced for the citizenship and the democratic rights, these demands all together find a measure of their historical, legal, and discursive formation inscribed into the geo-political markers and topographical-spatial boundaries. In short, what the accelerated development of tele-technologies, of cyberspace, of new topology and of ‘the virtual’ is producing, Derrida argues, is a deconstruction at work of the traditional, dominant concepts of state and citizenship. In a world ruled by the mono-perspectivism of global market economics, when and wherever a television is switched on, when and wherever a phone-call is made, when and wherever an Internet connection is established, the question of critical culture, of democracy, of political, and of de-territorialisation erupts. Television, radio and internet create ‘ghostly duplications’ in transmitting and declaring something present that instead is a spectral imagine of something occurring in a different place. Allow me, in passing, to remind that the occasional and explicit motive of The Other Heading is the media. 8 Here as elsewhere, the injunction seems double and contradictory for whoever is concerned with European cultural identity. If it is necessary to make sure that a centralizing hegemony is not  reconstituted, accordingly it is necessary to prevent borders, movements, and margins from multiplying, and to not cultivate for its own sake the minority differences, the untranslatable idiolects, the national antagonisms, or the chauvinisms of idiom. The European responsibility consists exactly in renouncing neither of these two contradictory imperatives.
 Following the optic of deconstructive standpoint and the concept of difference, it would seem that European cultural identity, like identity or identification in general, must belong to the experiment of the impossible if it must be equal to itself and to the other—up to the measure of its own immeasurable difference with itself.  Derrida writes, “Nevertheless, one will always be able de jure to ask what an ethics or a politics that measures responsibility only by the rule of the impossible can be: as if doing only what were possible amounted to abandoning the ethical and political realms, or as if, inversely, in order to take an authentic responsibility it were necessary to limit oneself to impossible, impractical, and inapplicable decisions”(OH, 45-6). The national affirmation, as an essentially modern phenomenon, remains always a philosopheme. National hegemony aims to justify itself in name of a privilege in responsibility and in memory of the universal. However, the backbone of this national self-affirmation- similar to Heideggerian Selbstbehauptung and the nuclear statement of the national "ego" or "subject"- remains quite dry. Derrida argues "I am (we are) all the more national for being European, all the more European for being trans-European and international; no one is more cosmopolitan and authentically universal than the one, than this 'we,' who is speaking to you"(OH, 48). In the logic of this sound cosmopolitan discourse, what is proper to a particular nation or idiom, and what is proper to Europe, analogically, is to advance itself as a heading for the universal essence of humanity. Here, I am talking about the human rights, the freedom of thought, and consequently the freedom to publish, and the freedom to teach. 
 From the issue of the head to the issue of the geopolitical frontiers, which seems to Derrida less uncertain than geographical ones, we rediscover the spiritual frontiers. There is great uncertainty regarding the borders of Europe, but not regarding its spiritual borders (around the ideas of philosophy, reason, monotheism, Jewish, Greek, Christian Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Islamic memories, around Jerusalem, a Jerusalem itself divided, torn apart, around Athens, Rome, Moscow, Paris, and it is necessary to add etc. In The Freedom of Spirit, published in 1939, just in a moment of critic imminence whose stake is the destiny of European culture, Valéry makes an appeal “to the word capital, precisely in order to define culture—and the Mediterranean. That is how all that wealth incarnates into being, to which our culture owes practically everything, at least in its origins; I may say that the Mediterranean has been a veritable machine for making civilization. In addition, in creating trade, it necessarily created freedom of the spirit. On the shores of the Mediterranean, then, spirit, culture, and trade are round together. ([History and Politics, p. 196])” (OH, 63-4, Italics added).
Re-echoing Valery and pointing out another heading, Derrida notes that if it is impossible to name Europe without speaking in Latin, without acknowledging a Graeco-Romano-Christian heritage, allied to the imperial pursuit of capital, it is possible, then, to dream of another heading, not far from Rome, but no longer Rome. Derrida writes, ‘‘this Mediterranean shore also interests me- coming as I do from the other shore if not from the other heading (from a shore that is principally neither French, nor European, nor Latin, nor Christian’’ (OH, 35-36). On the other side of the Mediterranean, Derrida can imagine a Europe that would find place not just for Athens and Rome but also for Jerusalem and Byzantium.

Part II (The Radical Other Heading)
From the Aporia of Present to Democracy to Come. The infinite task.

 Toward the end of the book, Derrida claims that Europe must recover its best feature, that which is neither yet, nor has ever been, nor will ever be Europe, a task for the future inspired by the Husserlian Crisis. Husserl tells us that we Europeans are liable ‘’to respond to the call of European memory, to recall what has been promised under the name Europe (OH, 76). For example, in reference to the issue of hospitality, that today divides our European and national consciences, European responsibility dictates the opening-up of Europe, ‘’welcoming foreigners in order not only to integrate them but also to recognize and accept their alterity (OH, 77). Assuming the European heritage, this duty refers to a different ‘’idea of democracy… something that remains to be thought and to come [a venir]…, a democracy that must have the structure of a promise- and thus the memory of that which carries the future, the to-come, (opposite to) here and now’’ (OH, 78).  Such  European idea of democracy ‘’dictates respecting differences, idioms, minorities, singularities, but also the universality of formal law, the desire for translation, agreement, and univocity, the law of majority, opposition to racism, nationalism, and xenophobia’’(OH, 78). It demands, moreover ‘’tolerating and respecting all that is not placed under the authority of reason. It may have to do with faith, with different forms of faith. It may also have to do with certain thoughts, whether questioning thoughts or not… For these thoughts Europe may also try to remain faithful to the ideal of Enlightenment (Aufklarung, Illuminism), acknowledging its limits in order to work on the Enlightenment of our time, the time that is ours—today (OH, 78-79). No doubt, such duties call for a special responsibility, effective and- with experience, through experiment- interminable.
 At the end of the pamphlet, Derrida concludes thus: “I am European, I am no doubt a European intellectual, and I like to recall this, I like to recall this to myself, and why would I deny it? But, I am not, nor do I feel, European in every part, that is, European through and through. By which I mean, by which I wish to say, or must say: I do not want to be and must not be European through and through, European in every part. My cultural identity, that in the name of which I speak, is not only European, it is not identical to itself, and I am not "cultural" through and through, "cultural" in every part”(OH, 82). Neither Eurocentrist, nor anti-Eurocentrist, what comes through Derrida’s critical and continual interrogation of European identity, in which Europe imposes both as a conception and as a task of universality, is the acknowledgment of a public and political space, and of an infinite task. Before his death, in the short article “A Europe of Hope” delivered in May 2004, Derrida launched his final prayer and hope for the future Europe, for an Other Heading.
Democracy and responsibility: Derrida and Kant.
 In commenting on the mentioned duties, one would think of appealing once more to Husserl. However, the most recent scholarly debate leads to writing further on the relationship between Kant and Derrida and the intersection and interaction between ethics and politics.
 Derrida has frequently said ‘I am ultra-Kantian. I am Kantian, but I am more than Kantian‘. Towards the end of the Critique of Pure Reason, at Canon of Pure Reason, Kant reformulates the three central preoccupations of his philosophy: What can I know? What should I do? What can I hope for? Here, what interest us are particularly the second and the third questions. Kant writes: “The second question is merely practical. As such, to be sure, it can belong to pure reason, but in that case is not transcendental, but moral, and thus cannot be in itself an object of critique. The third question ‘If I do what I should, what may I then hope?’ is simultaneously practical and theoretical, so that the practical leads like clue to a reply to the theoretical question and, in its highest form, the speculative question. For all hope concerns happiness, and with respect to the practical and the moral law it is the very same as what knowledge and the natural law is with regard to theoretical cognition of things’’.9 What shall I do? What shall the Europeans do?  Kant’s ethics is based on the possible; Derrida’s ethics is guided by the impossible. Kantian hospitality depends on a wide range of criteria concerning identity and length of stay, namely, it is conditional. Derridean hospitality is part of ethical sphere, and is of unconditional demand.
 Let us pause, for a moment, at this well-known case of deconstructive practice, an example of un-conditionality without sovereignty as J. Caputo calls it. In Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida writes: “we must be reminded of this implacable law of hospitality: the hôte who receives (the host), the one who welcomes the invited or received hôte (the guest), the welcoming hôte who considers himself the owner of the place [propriétaire des lieux], is in truth a hôte received in his home”.10 But, the question remains: could unlimited hospitality in some form ever become the policy of the State? Could an ethics of hospitality ever be translated into a politics of totally open borders and welcoming democratic treatment of all immigrants and refugees? In other words, could politics ever become ethical? The sensible, “realistic” answer is not, at least not completely. For asylum seekers, one of the topics Derrida has frequently been concerned with, Derrida concedes that states and their laws generally rule the political criteria. Derrida concedes, too, that the conditions of hospitality may be necessary, but he retorts the argument saying that the difficulties must be addressed in a different way. Hospitality, he argues, is ‘an art and a poetics’ and, despite its political and ethical aspects, it should be reinvented every time. The kind of hospitality that can be reshaped for each situation is very significant in its limitlessness. In short, Derrida thinks that the true political invention lies in experiencing and negotiating the limits of the aporias of universality and particularity/singularity, all the while remaining aware of the impossibility of such a task. Politics must be conceived in a way that makes negotiating with ethics a more promising affair. No doubt, an unconditional hospitality is practically impossible to live; yet, without at least the thought of this pure and unconditional hospitality, of hospitality itself, we would have no concept of hospitality in general and would not even be able to determine any rules for conditional hospitality. We must therefore ‘‘re-inscribe the unconditional into certain conditions’’. 

  Europe and the scene of inheritance. The Prince Hamlet.
Democracy is born in Greece, and by extension in Europe. I quote at some length from Thucydides’Peloponnesian wars the famous speech of Pericles. We read: “Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states; we are rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration favours the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if no social standing, advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition. The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbor for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no positive penalty. But all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws, particularly such as regard the protection of the injured, whether they are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which, although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace”.11 The early democracy of Athens names itself isonomia, literally, equality before the law. In practice, this means citizens equally possessing the same freedom to speak publicly of the common affairs in the polis, and the ability to resolve differences through discourses and argumentations rather than violence. In the margin of Pericles’ democratic and/or demagogic speech, Derrida certainly would say ‘‘we are still Greeks, certainly, but perhaps other Greeks, we were not born from just that Greek send-off; we are certainly still other Greeks, with the memory of events that are irreducible to the Greek genealogy, but other enough to have not only, also, altered the Greek in us, but to bear within us something wholly other than the Greek’’. 12 Greece, or whatever deserves the name Greek, is that which actually makes it possible to envision another Europe, but also that we, who are Greeks, are Greeks of another kind, are Other Greeks. If democracy remains the horizon of our time, the only constitutional paradigm, in which, in principle, one finds the right and the responsibility to criticize publicly everything, including the idea of democracy, its concept, its history and its name, for Derrida ‘democracy to come’ remains the horizon beyond which is possible/impossible to think. Today we are no longer at the Greek polis, at the traditional concept of politeia. Neither Pericles’s democracy, nor the current ‘liberal democracy’ are the Derridean ‘democracy to come’. The principle of equality-cited many times in Politics of Friendship tends to introduce measure and calculation (and thus conditionality), compromises justice. Marx would say it is constantly stigmatized by a bourgeois limitation. The democracy to come wants to go beyond the principle of equality; it is grounded on transgression; it is unconditional and critical of the tyranny of number, rejects the rational calculation, and may be at worst envisioned as a challenge to the authority and sovereignty of the state, and of course, also to a desirable, future European state. On the international scale, a democracy to come may emerge in new institutions such as the International Criminal Court. 
What kind of democracy for Europe? In Politics of Friendship, Derrida transposes the aporias of political friendship to democracy. Democracy is a promise of universal inclusiveness of each singular one counting equally; it remains a promise, infinitely deferred, always 'to come' and 'spectral', hovering between absence and presence. Its  fraternal or national limitation of members naturalizes the ineluctable decision of inclusion and exclusion, and begets an inevitable self-delimitation. Derrida speaks diffusely of the disjunctive laws of democracy that dictate, simultaneously and impossibly, the requirement of ‘calculable majorities’ of ‘stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal’ on the one hand. On the other, an absolute ‘respect for irreducible singularity or alterity’ a disjunction that issues in a demand for a ‘democracy to come’ that remains unrealizable in any given ‘present’. 13 We have on the one hand, the absolute respect for irreducible singularity; on the other, as Aristotle tells us (Nicomachean Ethics), living in company with the others. The ethical and the political, Derrida acknowledges, are structurally beset by aporias, and require any responsible decision to pass through the ordeal of undecidability. In Specters of Marx, we read "The 'undecidable' has never been, for me, the opposite of decision: it is the condition of decision wherever decision cannot be deduced from an existing body of knowledge as it would be by a calculating machine" .14 To privilege one's 'own' language is inescapable; to take a decision for the subject by 'the other' yet remains violent, forgetful of the other language and idiom. The quasi-concept of 'democracy to come' and the strategies of thought informing this concept make clear that Derrida's thought turns around the determination of the law, and the necessary excess of the law within that determination.  Philosophy, in order to be critical, must be concerned with both the determination of justice and the excess of justice over its determination. This double strategy unties the philosophical deconstruction from politics at the very moment it ties deconstruction to it. 
The aporia of 'democracy to come' has limited purchase upon world actuality and the formation of universal laws. This the criticism of some post-Derridean philosophers, ill disposed to accept the impotent messianism of democracy to come, as Žižek who writes: ‘Derrida’s notion of ‘deconstruction as ethics’ seems to rely on a utopian hope which sustains the spectre of ‘infinite justice’, forever postponed, always to come’15 The question remains; politics  is not a matter of passive expectation; it envisages action. And, if the idea of justice cannot be articulated, it cannot provide any aim for political action. According to Derrida all that remains to guide us is decision, pure and simple: a decision for justice or democracy, and for a particular understanding of both. Žižek continues thus ‘Derrida’s later ‘political’ writings as too beholden to the impossible object of desire, too ‘utopian’ in their commitment to the promise of democracy, hospitality, justice, friendship, the gift, and so on: ‘Derrida’s notion of ‘deconstruction as ethics’ seems to rely on a utopian hope which sustains the spectre of ‘infinite justice’, forever postponed, always to come, but nonetheless here as the ultimate horizon of our activity’ (ib.) .
 Again, how may the philosophical community respond in the living present? There is no pre-determined path leading from philosophy to politics, from thought to action, from politics to ethics. If the ‘to-come’ that marks the dis-adjusted and disjointed time of present is always already haunting the ‘actual’ in political interventions, we can never rest assured with the good conscience of having made the right decision. We are always hanging over the indecision of decision and the hyperbolic responsibility for the other, responsibility fraught with risks, existential risks and dangers. To be means to inherit.  Responsibility consists “in responding, hence in answering to the other, before the other and before the law, and if possible publicly, answering for itself, its intentions, its aims, and for the name of the agent deemed responsible”.16 Maybe, the very idea of responsibility is an impossible idea. 
In the volume La Crise de l’esprit. Note in essays quasi politiques,17 Valery presents an imaginary European Hamlet leaning from a terrace that overlooks the whole of Europe and looking at million of ghosts. He is an intellectual who reflects on life and death, is oppressed by the weight of his discoveries and his knowledge, and at the same time is incapable of any action. He is someone whose troubles appear both to live in the moment and to have a past. He reflects on the boredom of the past that needs to be rediscovered, at the folly of continual innovation (Odysseus). He is torn between two crevasses, since two are the dangers confronting the world: order and disorder. Descending from the terrace, the European Hamlet picks up a skull and recognizes it for the trace of the development of European history: “Whose was it?  This one was Lionardo ... And this other skull is that of Leibniz who dreamed of universal peace. And this one was Kant qui genuit Hegel, qui genuit Marx, qui genuit ... Hamlet does not know what to do with all these skulls. But if he abandons them! ... Will he cease to be himself? 17 What would the European intellectual become? It is time to say goodbye to ghosts since it has no need for them any longer? Clearly, for Hamlet the image-figure of the skull represents the manner for connecting the past and the present, essentially the mind/spirit that leads to another identification of the other (autre cap). There is a link with spectrality and European legacy, that of the figure of revenant and/or arrivant. The specters are important for European memory. Hamlet’s confrontation with the ghost of his father precipitates the judgment that ‘the time is out of joint’, and becomes his (of Hamlet) responsibility, as his father’s heir, to set things right. Just as the Prince Hamlet must address the issues of inheritance, responsibility, and promise for the future in response to the ghost of his father (the other), all of us Europeans living now—in this dis-jointed or dis-adjusted time—must address the question of inheritance, of responsibility and of promise. The un-conditionality and infinite responsibility does not mean we should simply make better policies, but that in doing so (making politics) the entire apparatus of Western political culture must be removed and re-thought in an unpredictable and emerging future. Ethics does not involve the mere application of well-worn maxims; ethics becomes reacquainted only with fear and trembling that accompanies any decision by means of the ‘ethicality of ethics’. Ethics involves the exigency of decisions, since decisions, taken in a non-metaphysical sense, are unavoidable, and a decision is always particular, confined to a singular and unique situation, responding to a unique call from the other. 
Epilogue
 Has Derrida sufficiently entertained the idea of democracy to come? Is it so distant to be effectively meaningless? The Derridean advice consists in keeping the force of rethinking democracy beyond the borders of the political, of rethinking the political beyond the political, of rethinking the democratic beyond democracy. Let me emphasize that for Derrida, or his specter, remains that ‘democracy to come’ gives movement to democracy, that democracy to come and democracy are implicated in the play between identity and difference, are the condition of the production of meaning. At the same time, for Derrida subsists the search for a path towards a real, concrete democracy beyond democracy, something that can be accomplished only by way of approximation that may give a plus of democracy to the present and future of Europe. As a Mediterranean intellectual Derrida would say: Europeans  de tous les pays, encore un effort. 
 I would like to wind down, in closing, with the continuation of the second thought in the exergue: “It is possible to open up to the ‘come’ of a certain democracy which is no longer an insult to the friendship we have striven to think beyond the homo fraternal and phallogocentric scheme? When will we be ready for an experience that friendship, which would at last, be just, just beyond the law, and measured up against its measurelessness? O my democratic friends...” Politics of Friendship 18 
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